Financial gradualism and banking crises in North  Africa region: an investigation by a panel logit model by KHATTAB, Ahmed & IHADIYAN, Abid
Journal of 
Economics and Political Economy 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 4                         December 2017                           Issue 4 
 
Financial gradualism and banking crises in North  
Africa region: an investigation by a panel logit model 
 
By Ahmed KHATTAB a† & Abid IHADIYANab 
 
Abstract. In order to overcome the troubles of the crisis in the seventies, North African 
countries have adopted financial liberalization policies to enhance their economic growth. 
Moreover, these policies have affected the stability of their banking systems. The purpose 
of this study is to test the impact of financial liberalization on the probability of appearance 
of banking crises which covers a sample of four countries of the North Africa region during 
the period 1970-2003 by using a panel logit model. The empirical analysis of this study 
suggests that (a) the degree of financial liberalization impact significantly the occurrence of 
banking crises in the countries of the region, (b) the order of financial liberalization 
between internal and external financial liberalization is also crucial for the emergence of 
banking crises. 
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1. Introduction 
inancial crises have increased in emerging countries since the seventies. 
These have resulted in very different explanations for their occurrence 
mechanisms, progress and contagion. However, since the pioneering studies 
of Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999), most economists are of the view to consider that 
these crises are related to the implemented financial liberalization policies. Thus, 
the study of Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (1998), dedicated to banking crises 
concludes that financial liberalization is a significant factor in explaining banking 
crises. Similarly, Glick & Hutchison (1999) show that financial liberalization 
explains the appearance of "twin crises". Moreover, the limit of this work is the 
fact that they argue the similarity of liberalization process for all countries. Also, 
Williamson & Mahar (1998) have pointed out, from the financial liberalization 
experience of thirty-four countries over the period 1973-1996, the danger 
associated with liberalization "premature", both badly organized and poorly 
controlled. 
For Johnston (1997), the non-compatibility of internal and external 
liberalization has played a predominant role in the infection and spread of the crisis 
in emerging countries. the crisis is linked to poor sequencing of capital account 
liberalization or arbitrary opening of financial markets Eichengreen (2000). These 
works have the merit to distinguish between: the liberalization of the domestic 
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financial system, the opening of financial markets and the liberalization of the 
capital account. But their weakness is the fact that it is essentially a concrete 
analyzes of financial liberalization experiences, without considering econometric 
tools. 
Our present study focuses on the North Africa region countries, which 
represents the newly exposed countries to the international finance. The study 
period is from 1970 to 2003 during which was largely achieved their financial 
liberalization. Otherwise, the intermediation function leads to a fundamental 
fragility of banks resulting from what they must reconcile permanently; liquid 
liabilities (deposits) and long commitments. 
The vulnerability of banks is reinforced by misalignments in the balance sheet 
structures related to the development of market operations and international 
openness, from the perspective of the quality of receivables, assets and from the 
financing of foreign currency, on the liability side. This is the meaning given by 
Dornbusch (2001) to the "new style balance sheet crises". Concerning the 
macroeconomic level, this approach is based on the idea that financial 
liberalization promotes capital inflows, with two sets of consequences: first, a rapid 
expansion of bank credit and the money supply and stimulating inflation training 
speculative bubbles; then, with flexible exchange rates, a currency appreciation that 
reduces exports and slows economic growth. This unfavorable macroeconomic 
development makes financial officers vulnerable, brings a loss of confidence by 
non-residents, who suddenly withdraw their capital, causing bank failures, often 
amplified by a currency crisis; they represent the "twin crises" banking and 
currency crises that have multiplied in emerging countries Kaminsky & Reinhart, 
(1999). 
The study of the relationship between financial liberalization and the recent 
banking crises shows the existence of a critical theoretical scourge, which is based 
on two fundamental literatures: While the first literature defends the benefits of the 
principle of financial liberalization with its positive and direct effect on the 
functioning of the banking system and hence on reducing the cost of capital, the 
second argues that financial liberalization has accentuated financial instability, 
bank failures and declining economic growth. 
 
2. Literature review 
The literature of financial liberalization began in the early 70s, during the 
building of the school of financial repression by its precursors McKinnon (1973) 
and Edwards (1984). These works emphasize the misdeeds of a repressed financial 
system, on both financial and real plans and certify that financial liberalization is 
the most effective way to develop banking intermediation, boost capital 
accumulation and promote economic growth in the path of developing countries. 
Other empirical works forming part of the same logic came forward a few years 
recently, it is essentially the work of Galbis (1977), Kapur (1976), Mathieson & 
Rojas-Suarez (1993), Levine & King (1993), Williamson & Mahar (1998) and 
others that devoted mainly to modelize the original contributions of McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973). 
Later, and following the progress made on endogenous growth in the early 90s, 
new approaches supporting the interest of financial liberalization have developed 
including the works of Bandiera et al., (2000), Caprio & Klingebiel (2000), Jbili, 
Enders & Treichel (1997), Harvey & Lundblad (2003), Mehrez & Kaufmann 
(2000) and others. Thus, seeking to establish other theoretical bases justifying the 
implementation of financial liberalization process, this work has generally reached 
similar conclusions: the financial system must be liberalized to ensure its smooth 
operation, increase financial savings, and promote productive investment, pushing 
technological innovation and supporting economic growth. Similarly, the literature 
of the banking crisis grew during the second half of the 90s, following the spread 
of bankruptcies and financial instabilities in the world and whose gravity appears 
unprecedented, affecting several countries. According to this literature, successful 
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financial liberalization experiences are very rare, and in the general case, 
liberalization is the cause of crises in the banking and financial systems 
accompanied by a sharp fall in growth and a contraction of the gross domestic 
product. Except the benefits of financial liberalization in relation to the importance 
of its costs has questioned the validity of it application, especially for countries in 
the way of development. 
Two approaches are interposed. One approach brought the banking crises of 
financial liberalization to macroeconomic and institutional causes and a second has 
linked the attacks to microeconomic causes. The first wave of empirical work 
argues that recent banking crises based on macroeconomic fundamentals and 
agrees to clarify that were particularly institutional preconditions of the financial 
liberalization process that were the major cause of crises and economic recessions. 
The second school of work argues that recent banking crises is based on 
microeconomic foundations and states that this is particularly, changes in the 
banking environment in the context of financial liberalization, which led to a 
deterioration of bank profitability and increased risks, which are the main causes of 
recent banking and economic crises. 
 
3. Data and empirical methodology 
3.1. Data 
This paper considers a sample of four North African countries, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Algeria and Egypt. The choice of the selected countries for this study is 
primarily dictated by the availability of reliable data. The panel covers the period 
1970–2003.  
The endogenous variable that has been retained is the banking crises (Crises) 
which is a dummy variable. 
The indicators of the degree of financial liberalization distinguish partial and 
total liberalization for each financial sector; domestic sector, financial markets and 
capital account. The partial and total liberalization are also dummies variables 
(dummy). The partial liberalization in each sector take the value 1 of partial 
liberalization periods of the sector , where at least one dimension of the sector was 
liberalized, and the value 0 of the control periods which represents full 
liberalization. Besides, total liberalization of each sector takes the value 1 of 
periods of full liberalization of the sector, when all the dimensions of the sector 
were liberalized, and the value 0 of the repression periods or partial liberalization. 
The Exogenous variables of this study are: growth of real GDP per head 
(GDP/K), the budget (Deficit/GDP), bank credit / GDP (credit / GDP), the ratio M2 
to international foreign exchange reserves (M2 / Reserve ), interest rates (rate int), 
and dummies variables (Dummy) which are: domestic liberalization (LIB DOM), 
liberalization of financial markets (LIB FIN), liberalization of the capital account 
(LIB CAP), partial liberalization (partial LIB), full liberalization (total LIB), 
domestic financial liberalization precedes external financial liberalization (1storder), 
external financial liberalization precedes domestic financial liberalization 
(2ndorder).  
With the exception of the variable of the degree liberalization that was retained 
from the database of Gamra & Plihon (2007), the other variables were obtained 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the (World Bank, 
2013).  
Our study uses the "logit" model. Besides its simplicity, this method has the 
advantage of measuring the contribution of a variable to the probability of 
occurrence of a crisis at one time, allowing to evaluate the effect of the explanatory 
variables on the dependent variable. Moreover, this estimation method takes 
account of the qualitative nature of certain variables, which usually causes crises. It 
responds to the problem of the empirical work that evaluates the effect of partial 
and full liberalization of financial variables on the probability of occurrence of 
banking crises. 
In view of this issue, we asked the following questions: 
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 Q1: Are banking crises affected by the degree of financial liberalization? 
 Q2: Are banking crises affected by the timing and order of financial 
liberalization measures? 
To answer these questions, we have made two assumptions: 
 H1: Banking crises are affected by the degree of financial liberalization. 
 H2: The chronology of liberalization largely affects the banking crises. 
 
3.2. The empirical methodology 
The logistic regression is a commonly used model. It is used when the 
dependent variable (dependent variable Y) is qualitative, usually binary. The 
explanatory variables (independent variables Xi) in the contrary may be either 
qualitative or quantitative. The dependent variable is usually the occurrence or not 
of an event (crises, illness ..., or not) and the independent variables are those that 
may influence the occurrence of the event. 
The "logit" model is the econometric method most commonly used in the 
analysis of banking and financial crises. Despite its simplicity, it has the privilege 
to measure the contribution of a variable to the probability of appearance of a crisis 
by calculating the vicinity of the average value of variables. In addition, it takes 
into account the qualitative nature of certain variables which usually cause crises. 
The first to use this model are Eichengreen & Leblang (2003) using data for 
industrialized countries over the period (1973-1993) in order to identify the 
common origins of currency crises and elucidate their contagious nature. Other 
economists have applied this method to the analysis of banking crises, mainly 
Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache (1998), who performed various tests of the logit 
model to test the impact of financial liberalization, the institutional environment 
and the explicit deposit insurance on bank crises with a panel of developed and 
developing countries during the period (1980-1994), (1980-1995) and (1980- 
1997). 
3.2.1. The financial liberalization variable 
Financial liberalization is defined as a process of dismantling all forms of 
quantitative or qualitative regulatory control to restrictive state imposed on 
institutional structures, instruments and activities of various agents on segments of 
the financial sector, not only in internally but also internationally Boyer, Dehove, 
& Plihon (2004). These policies aim to improve the efficiency of the financial 
systems, to reduce the risks associated with currency fluctuations and interest rates, 
and meet new funding needs McKinnon (1973). A liberalized financial system is 
characterized by a triple movement of liberalization: the domestic financial 
liberalization, opening of financial markets and the capital account. 
3.2.1.1. The domestic financial liberalization 
It measures the liberalization of interest rates, credit, reserve requirements, and 
banking competition. 
 The liberalization of interest rates on the elimination of control, fixing and 
capping lending rates and credit. 
 The liberalization of credit represents the elimination of control, orientation 
towards priority sectors, capping appropriations for other sectors and the 
reduction or elimination of reserve requirements. 
 The liberalization of banking competition consists of the removal of limitations 
on the installation and the participation of domestic and foreign banks, 
restrictions related to the specialization of banks and the establishment of 
universal banks. 
3.2.1.2. Financial markets liberalization 
It means removing restrictions to the detention by foreign investors of shares of 
listed companies on the domestic securities market and the removal of constraints 
to the repatriation of capital and payment of dividends, interest and profits. 
3.2.1.3. The openness of the capital account 
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It represents the removal of barriers that prevent banks and other financial 
institutions to make loans abroad, removal of control over the exchange rate 
applied to transactions relating to the current account and capital account 
liberalization and capital flows. For each sector, three plans are identified: fully 
liberalized, partially liberalized and repressed. Thus, a financial system is 
considered fully liberalized if the three sectors are fully liberalized and considered 
partially liberalized if at least one sector is partially liberalized. Otherwise, 
Informations of partial and full liberalization of the sector and the dates of partial 
and full liberalization of the entire financial system are presented in (Appendice 1). 
3.2.2. The banking crises variable 
A banking crisis is a situation in which banks face an accumulation of non-
performing loans and bad debts. They face serious financial problems, which cause 
a wave of bank runs, prolonged closures of banks, panics or bank failures, which 
involve a wide support for movement by the state, generalized government 
guarantees deposit or bank nationalization. 
In this study, we adopt the definition of banking crises of Caprio & Klingebiel 
(1996). A banking crisis is defined as a situation in which "the whole or the 
majority of bank capital is eroded" It means that banks face different losses that 
reduce various prudential ratios, and reveal a phenomenon of financial illusion. 
Two kinds of crises have been distinguished by Caprio & Klingebiel (1996), 
systemic and non-systemic crises (Appendice 2). For systemic crises, these 
problems are the beginning of a cascade of similar events for the rest of the 
financial institutions, which implies that the wave of crises affecting a large part of 
the banking sector and some banks who hold most of the assets of the banking 
system. For non-systemic crises, these issues apply only some small or medium 
banks. 
3.2.3. The presentation of the econometric model 
On a panel of four countries in the North Africa region (Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia and Egypt) over the period (1970-2003),which represents a period that 
includes the highest number of episodes of banking crises and financial 
liberalization, noted "t" , the basic model is: 
 
Yit = âXit + åit                                                                                                                                                 (1) 
 
With: i = {1, …, N} ; t = {1, …, T}.                                                         
“Y” is the “Dummy” matrix variable of banking crises, “â” is a vector of “N” 
unknown coefficients to estimate, “X” is the matrix of explanatory variables and 
“å” is the residue matrix. 
Since “Yit” is the matrix of “dummy” variables that takes the value 1 if there is 
a banking crisis and 0 otherwise, we can write: 
P (Yit = 1 / Xi1, X i2, …, XiN) = F (âXit) where F is the distribution function of åit . 
By using the assumption of logistic distribution, we find the logit model: 
 
F a Xit =
1
1+exp (−βX it )
                                                                                           (2) 
 
 
The probability associated with this model is: 
 
𝐿 =  𝑇𝑇𝑡=1  𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑃  𝑌𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝑋𝑖1,𝑋𝑖2,…,𝑋𝑖𝑁
                                                   (3) 
 
𝐿 =  𝑇𝑇𝑡=1  𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 )
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑥 1 − 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) 
1−𝑌𝑖𝑡                                 (4) 
 
The logarithm of this likelihood is written: 
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     𝑙𝑛𝐿 =
 𝑇𝑡=1..𝑇  𝑁 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑥 ln 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 ) +𝑖=1..𝑁
 1 −
𝑌𝑖𝑡  𝑥 ln 1 −
𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                         (5) 
 
So the expectation of “Y” takes only two values , we use the logistic function 
bellow: 
 
 𝑓 𝑥 =
exp  𝑥 
1+exp  𝑥 
= 𝑝         (6) 
 
So: 0 <f(x) <1 and E(Y) = 0 or 1 
- Y follows a Bernoulli law of “p” parameter. 
The “logit” model is represented as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝑝 = ln  
𝑝
1−𝑝
 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯+  𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑘                                     (7) 
 
This last equation represents the function of the “logit” model. 
 
4. Statistic and econometric results 
The empirical study attempts to evaluate the effect of gradualism of financial 
liberalization initiated by the 4 predefined countries on the probability the 
appearance of banking crises over the period (1970-2003). This is specifically to 
determine if the degree and order of financial liberalization are the cause of the 
observed banking crises. 
 
Table 1.  Featured statistics (1970-2002) 
 CRED/PIB CRISES PIB.REEL DEFICIT M2/RESEV TX.INT 
 Mean 62.68 0.56 4.69 -1.33 7.28 2.06 
 Median 60.53 1.00 4.70 -1.83 5.67 1.10 
 Maximum 110.9 1.00 27.42 9.70 21.47 15.10 
 Minimum 27.09 0.00 -11.33 -6.74 1.15 -17.08 
 Std. Dev. 20.65 0.49 4.37 2.13 4.40 5.17 
 Skewness 0.43 -0.26 0.82 1.60 1.17 -0.01 
 Kurtosis 2.37 1.07 8.80 8.46 3.71 4.66 
 Jarque-Bera 6.47 22.69 206.60 227.66 33.97 15.70 
 Probability 0.039 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Sum 8525.21 77.0 638.7 -181.8 990.73 280.34 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 57590.4 33.40 2581.0 614.3 2618.16 3610.9 
 Observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 
Source : Authors, from Eviews 2008. 
 
Table 2. Correlation between control variables 
 CRED/PIB CRISES PIB.REEL DEFICIT M2/RESEV TX.INT 
CRED/PIB 1 0.01 -0.07 -0.39 0.31 0.26 
CRISES 0.014*** 1 -0.06 -0.11 0.03 0.19 
PIB.REEL -0.07 -0.06*** 1 -0.008 -0.012 0.01 
DEFICIT -0.39* -0.12* -0.008*** 1 -0.23 -0.10 
M2/RESEV 0.31* 0.03*** -0.012*** -0.23* 1 -0.08 
TX.INT 0.26* 0.20* 0.015*** -0.10* -0.08*** 1 
Source: Authors, from Eviews 2008. 
Note: * Confidence level of 1%; ***: Confidence level of 10%  
 
According to Table 1 and Table 2, we see that there exist correlations between 
the variables: 
• Strong negative correlation between the variable “Deficit” and the variables 
“crises”, “M2/reserves” and “interest rates”.  
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(4), A. Khattab, & A. Ihadiyan, p.343-355. 
349 
349 
• Strong positive correlation between the “credit/GDP” and the variables “M2/ 
reserves” and “interest rates”. There is also a strong positive correlation 
between the crisis and the variable “interest rates”.  
• Low negative correlation between “GDP” and the variables “deficit” and “M2 / 
reserve”. The latter also marks a weak negative correlation with variable 
“interest rates”.  
• A weak positive correlation between the “credit / GDP” and “crisis” and also 
between the variable “crisis” and the “M2 / reserves”. There is also a weak 
positive correlation between “GDP” and the “M2/reserves”. 
 
4.1. Degree of liberalization and banking crises  
The indicators of the degree of financial liberalization distinguish partial and 
total liberalization for each financial sector; domestic sector, financial markets and 
capital account. The partial and total liberalization are dummies variables 
(dummy). The partial liberalization in each sector take the value 1 of partial 
liberalization periods of the sector; where at least one dimension of the sector was 
liberalized, and the value 0 of the control periods which represents full 
liberalization. Besides, total liberalization of each sector takes the value 1 of 
periods of full liberalization of the sector, when all the dimensions of the sector 
were liberalized, and the value 0 of the repression periods or partial liberalization. 
 
Table 3.  Binary Logit with dependant variable (CRISES) and partial liberalization 
  Dependent Variable : CRISES 
  Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
  Sample: 1970 2003 
  Included observations: 136 
  Convergence achieved after 3 iterations 
  Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
 CREDIT_PIB -0.016038 0.011473 -1.397821 0.1622 
 CROIS_PIB_REEL -0.004986 0.044515 -0.112011 0.9108 
 DEFICIT_PIB -0.153382 0.098269 -1.560834 0.1186 
 LIB_PARTIEL 1.009132 0.426794 2.364448 0.0181 
 M2_RESERVE 0.069551 0.052683 1.320179 0.1868 
 RAPIDITE 0.865462 0.805859 1.073961 0.2828 
 TAUX_D_INTERET 0.037536 0.045203 0.830392 0.4063 
 C -0.085635 0.737160 -0.116169 0.9075 
 McFadden R-squared 0.095058 Mean dependent var 0.566176 
 S.D. dependent var 0.497434 S.E. of regression 0.481754 
 Akaike info criterion 1.356264 Sum squared resid 29.70714 
 Schwarz criterion 1.527597 Log likelihood 84.22599 
 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.425890       Deviance 168.4520 
 Restr. deviance 186.1467       Restr. log likelihood -93.07334 
 LR statistic 17.69470       Avg. log likelihood -0.619309 
 Prob(LR statistic) 0.013426  
 Obs with Dep=0 59       Total obs 136 
 Obs with Dep=1 77  
Source : Authors, from Eviews 2008. 
 
Table 4. Binary Logit with dependant variable (CRISES) and full liberalization 
  Dependent Variable : CRISES 
  Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
  Sample: 1970 2003 
  Included observations: 136 
  Convergence achieved after 3 iterations 
  Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
 CREDIT_PIB -0.013826 0.011061 -1.250021 0.2113 
 CROIS_PIB_REEL -0.036155 0.041883 -0.863222 0.3880 
 DEFICIT_PIB -0.143412 0.099794 -1.437083 0.1507 
 LIB_TOTALE 0.335783 0.768704 0.436817 0.6622 
 M2_RESERVE 0.031116 0.046753 0.665530 0.5057 
 TAUX_D_INTERET 0.090261 0.040309 2.239218 0.0251 
 C 0.682585 0.657557 1.038062 0.2992 
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 McFadden R-squared 0.049371  Mean dependent var 0.566176 
 S.D. dependent var 0.497434  S.E. of regression 0.491518 
 Akaike info criterion 1.404092  Sum squared resid 31.16505 
 Schwarz criterion 1.554008  Log likelihood -88.47824 
 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.465014  Deviance 176.9565 
 Restr. deviance 186.1467  Restr. log likelihood -93.07334 
 LR statistic 9.190194  Avg. log likelihood -0.650575 
 Prob(LR statistic) 0.163161  
  Obs with Dep=0 59  Total obs 136 
  Obs with Dep=1 77  
Source : Authors, from Eviews 2008. 
 
Table 5. Binary Logit with (CRISES) and the three forms of liberalization 
 Dependent Variable : CRISES 
 Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 Sample: 1970 2003 
 Included observations: 136 
 Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
 Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
 CREDIT_PIB -0.010342 0.011539 -0.896250 0.3701 
 CROIS_PIB_REEL -0.010441 0.044152 -0.236468 0.8131 
 DEFICIT_PIB -0.164231 0.100151 -1.639834 0.1010 
 M2_RESERVE 0.042636 0.057822 0.737374 0.4609 
 TAUX_D_INTERET 0.058440 0.045122 1.295162 0.1953 
 LIB_CAP -0.829684 0.653499 -1.269602 0.2042 
 LIB_DOM 1.002014 0.444355 2.254983 0.0241 
 LIB_FIN 0.223753 0.551684 0.405581 0.6851 
 C -0.574843 0.884968 -0.649563 0.5160 
 McFadden R-squared 0.093935  Mean dependent var 0.566176 
 S.D. dependent var 0.497434  S.E. of regression 0.481120 
 Akaike info criterion 1.372507  Sum squared resid 29.39751 
 Schwarz criterion 1.565256  Log likelihood -84.33048 
 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.450836  Deviance 168.6610 
Restr. deviance 186.1467  Restr. log likelihood -93.07334 
 LR statistic 17.48571  Avg. log likelihood -0.620077 
 Prob(LR statistic) 0.025431  
 Obs with Dep=0 59  Total obs 136 
 Obs with Dep=1 77  
Source : Authors, from Eviews 2008. 
 
The significant impact of the partial liberalization of the domestic financial 
sector in the appearance of banking crises in emerging countries, compared to total 
liberalization policies, referring to Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5, can be interpreted 
as follows: the more internal liberalization process grows, more its destabilizing 
effect weakens. The banking instability that accompanies the transition of an 
internal financial sector heavily controlled to a more liberalized and open financial 
system is due to the nature of the transitional phase during which the liberalization 
measures take place, which generates instability and banking defects for these 
countries. A process of adaptation and learning of banks to their new competitive 
environment settles gradually, as the liberalization movement accelerates by the 
time. 
Concerning the logit analysis between “CRISES” variable and the three forms 
of liberalization, the regression results indicate in the table-5 that financial 
liberalization in all it three dimensions; the domestic sector, the financial markets 
and the capital account, have a statistically significant impact on banking crises and 
is therefore an important factor in weakening banks. Indeed, the dummy variable of 
the domestic financial liberalization sector affect more strongly and positively the 
systemic banking crises. The liberalization of the domestic financial sector 
increases the fragility of banking systems and is explained by the fact that the 
abolition of the cap interest rates and credit control and reduction of entry barriers 
banks causes degradation value of banks by the eagerness of competition, eroding 
profits and increasing incentives for excessive risks. 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(4), A. Khattab, & A. Ihadiyan, p.343-355. 
351 
351 
4.2. The order of financial liberalization and banking crises 
This is to verify the importance of the priorities in the implementation of 
various reforms in the dynamics of banking crises. Two reform groups are 
differentiated: 
 The internal liberalization measures mainly include the banking sector and the 
liberalization of lending rates and deposit, credit, reducing reserve requirements 
and increased competition; 
 The liberalization of financial markets and the capital account, which comprise 
a majority of external liberalization, such as the removal of restrictions on 
capital movements and the repatriation of capital, interest and dividends. 
Thus, there are two financial liberalization processes: 
 1storder: domestic financial liberalization precedes external financial 
liberalization; 
 2ndorder: external financial liberalization precedes domestic financial 
liberalization. 
Two dummy variables representing two sequences of financial liberalization are 
regressed on binary variables of banking crises. In the first sequence, the variables 
take the value 1 when financial liberalization begins with internal liberalization and 
0 otherwise; in the second sequence, the variables take the value 1 when financial 
liberalization begins with external liberalization and 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 6.  Binary Logit with (CRISES) and the first sequence of liberalization 
Dependent Variable : CRISES 
 Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 Sample: 1970 2003 
 Included observations: 136 
 Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
 Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
 1st order -0.045204 0.578543 -0.078134 0.9377 
 CREDIT_PIB -0.012062 0.010302 -1.170811 0.2417 
 CROIS_PIB_REEL -0.036490 0.041947 -0.869913 0.3843 
 DEFICIT_PIB -0.138587 0.101476 -1.365718 0.1720 
 M2_RESERVE 0.023165 0.045417 0.510059 0.6100 
 TAUX_D_INTERET 0.094233 0.039603 2.379441 0.0173 
 C 0.664418 0.680321 0.976624 0.3288 
 McFadden R-squared 0.048367  Mean dependent var 0.566176 
 S.D. dependent var 0.497434  S.E. of regression 0.491649 
 Akaike info criterion 1.405466  Sum squared resid 31.18166 
 Schwarz criterion 1.555382  Log likelihood -88.57169 
 Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.466388  Deviance 177.1434 
 Restr. deviance 186.1467  Restr. log likelihood -93.07334 
 LR statistic 0.173393  Avg. log likelihood -0.651262 
 Prob(LR statistic) 0.025431  
 Obs with Dep=0 59  Total obs 136 
 Obs with Dep=1 77  
Source : Authors, from Eviews 2008. 
 
Table 7. Binary Logit with (CRISES) and the second sequence of liberalization 
Dependent Variable : CRISES 
 Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
 Sample: 1970 2003 
 Included observations: 136 
 Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
 Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
  2nd order 1.338319 0.725581 1.844479 0.0651 
  CREDIT_PIB -0.019322 0.011153 -1.732494 0.0832 
  CROIS_PIB_REEL -0.033316 0.042912 -0.776392 0.4375 
  DEFICIT_PIB -0.149537 0.100086 -1.494085 0.1352 
  M2_RESERVE 0.062531 0.049490 1.263493 0.2064 
  TAUX_D_INTERET 0.051089 0.044555 1.146637 0.2515 
  C 0.686224 0.653739 1.049690 0.2939 
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  McFadden R-squared 0.067501  Mean dependent var 0.566176 
  S.D. dependent var 0.497434  S.E. of regression 0.487895 
  Akaike info criterion 1.379276  Sum squared resid 30.70732 
  Schwarz criterion 1.529192  Log likelihood -86.79078 
  Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.440198  Deviance 173.5816 
  Restr. deviance 186.1467  Restr. log likelihood -93.07334 
  LR statistic 12.56512  Avg. log likelihood -0.638167 
  Prob(LR statistic) 0.050486  
 Obs with Dep=0 59  Total obs 136 
 Obs with Dep=1 77  
Source : Authors, from Eviews 2008. 
 
With reference to Table-6 and Table-7, we notice that the likelihood of banking 
crises increases when the country opened in priority on the outside before 
reforming its internal financial structures and in particular its domestic banking 
system. This result is consistent with the theory of optimal order (sequencing) of 
McKinnon (1991) which says that the success of financial liberalization policies 
implies compliance with a timeline of reforms, beginning in particular by internal 
financial reforms. The reason is that if liberalization of capital movements precedes 
the adaptation of internal financial structures to the opening on the outside, it risks 
reinforcing the phenomena of distortions created by the existence of inadequate 
national regulations to an opened international context. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
In this study, we reviewed the various theoretical contributions for the financial 
gradualism as prerequisites for financial development. Thus, to reduce the 
development of banking and financial crises, it is essential to find the right balance 
of financial gradualism to reap the benefits of international financial openness. 
To test the potential role of financial liberalization policies in the onset of 
banking crises, our empirical study sought to examine the process of financial 
liberalization in the north Africa region countries to contribute to a better 
understanding of the dynamics of recent banking crises. Thus, if there is a 
consensus on the role of liberalization in the explanation of financial crises in these 
countries, few studies have attempted to study and measure the share due to the 
order of financial liberalization in the initiation and appearance of crises. 
Conducted tests using the logit model show that the degree of financial 
liberalization act significantly in explaining banking crises in these countries. 
Overall, partial and incomplete liberalization of internal financial sector seems 
more destabilizing than full liberalization. And to counteract the destabilizing 
misdeeds of financial liberalization policies, we would like to introduce a number 
of recommendations to be followed by these countries: 
 Prior actions to financial liberalization: Financial liberalization must always be 
integrated into a comprehensive framework of structural adjustment. 
Stabilization efforts must precede especially liberalization, a substantial 
reduction in the size of the fiscal deficit and monetary growth, fueled by 
inflationary expectations.  
 The order of financial liberalization: This sequence requires the external 
opening of the capital account does not precede the liberalization of the 
domestic financial sector. Similarly, regulation and banking supervision must 
always be strengthened before any liberalization of the financial sector to ensure 
the soundness of the banking system through a restructuring or liquidation of 
institutions in distress or insolvent, holding a substantial volume of non-
performing credits. 
 The frequency of financial liberalization: Liberalization speed must be handled 
with extreme caution. It is very dangerous to remove all restrictions suddenly, 
to the extent that banks from a controlled environment need to gradually 
introduce reforms in order to offer them the opportunity to adjust to the new 
market. The liberalization of interest rates should be gradual. Indeed, 
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liberalization is more likely to succeed if it was spread over a long period of 
time, enabling the financial system to adapt itself to the new environment. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendice 1. Financial liberalization dates of the entire financial systems (by sectors) 
Countries Domestic financial system Financial markets Capital account All of sectors 
 partial Full partial Full partial Full partial Full 
Africa and middle East 
South africa 1980-1983 1983 - 1996 1985 - 1980 - 
Algeria 1987-1995 1995 1995 - 1994 - 1987 - 
Egypt  1991 - 1992 1990-1991 1991 1990-1992 1992 
Ghana 1987-1990 1990 1986 - - - 1986 - 
Morocco 1980-1996 1996 - 1993 1990  1980 - 
Tunisia 1986-1996 1996 1989 - 1993 - 1986 - 
Turkey 1980-1983 / 
1987-1989 1989 1983-1989 1989 1984-1990 1990 1980-1990 1990 
Zimbabwe  1991 1993 - - 1994 1991 - 
Source: According to the studies of  Bandiera, et al., (2000); Bekaert, Harvey, & Lundblad (2003); Bekaert & 
Harvey (2000a-b); Caprio, Atiyas, & Hanson, (1994); Demirguç-Kunt & Detragiache (1998); Hall (2003); Henry 
(2000a); Jbili, Enders & Treichel (1997); Johnston, Darbar & Echeverria, (1997); Kaminsky & Schmukler (2002); 
Kim & Singal, (2000); Levine & Zeros, (1998); Mehrez & Kaufman (2000); Williamson & Mahar (1998). 
Notes: A financial system is considered fully liberalized if the three sectors are fully liberalized. It is considered 
partially liberalized if at least one sector is partially liberalized. And it is considered suppressed if the three sectors 
are controlled. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendice 2. Review of bank crisis experiences in emerging countries (1970-2003) 
Countries Systemic crises Non-systemic crises 
Afrique et moyen orient 
South Africa - (1977) -(1989) 
Algeria (1990-1992) - 
Egypt Début des années 80 (1991-1995) 
Ghana (1982-1985) (1997-2003) 
Morocco Début des années 80 - 
Tunisia - (1991-1995) 
Turkey (1982-1985) /(2000-2003) (1994) 
Zimbabwe (1995-2003) - 
Source: Caprio & Klingebiel (2003) 
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